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Abstract
On September 20, 2017, Hurricane Maria made landfall on Puerto Rico as a category 4 storm 
resulting in serious widespread impact across the island, including communication and power 
outages, water systems impairment, and damage to life-saving infrastructure. In collaboration with 
the Puerto Rico Department of Health, the Public Health Branch (PHB), operating under the 
Department of Health and Human Services Incident Response Coordination Team, was tasked 
with completing assessments of health care facilities in Puerto Rico to determine infrastructure 
capabilities and post-hurricane capacity. Additionally in response to significant data entry and 
presentation needs, the PHB leadership worked with the Puerto Rico Planning Board to develop 
and test a new app-based infrastructure capacity assessment tool.
Assessments of hospitals were initiated September 28, 2017 and completed November 10, 2017 
(n=64 hospitals, 97%). Assessments of health care centers were initiated on October 7, 2017 with 
186 health care centers (87%) assessed through November 18, 2017.
All hospitals had working communications; however, 9% (n=17) of health care centers reported no 
communication capabilities. For the health care centers, 114 (61%) reported they were operational 
but had sustainment needs.
In conclusion, health care facility assessments indicated structural damage issues and operational 
capacity decreases, while health care centers reported loss of communication capabilities post-
Hurricane Maria.
Disclaimer
The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Agency 
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry/Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
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Background
Large-scale complex disasters, such as category 4 hurricanes, may result in severe impacts to 
physical property and operational capacity, including life-saving and life-sustaining services 
hospitals and selected health care centers, collectively term health care facilities (HCFs)(1). 
The consequences of large meteorological disasters and specific impacts on HCFs have been 
described previously in the literature and in damage assessment reports (2–8). Issues in the 
disaster event’s aftermath include threats to structural integrity (e.g., collapse, damage to 
roofs or frames), non-structural consequences (e.g., flooding, mold in indoor spaces, 
equipment damage), and health services impacts (e.g. surgical ward and pharmacy 
operations, staffing, patient surge) to critical facilities, such as hospitals and health care 
centers (6–11). After disaster events, the role of HCFs becomes more critical as these 
facilities provide life-saving and life-sustaining services to both survivors and emergency 
responders in affected communities. To ensure the availability of health care services to meet 
these critical public health needs, HCFs’ status and capacity for delivering care must be 
promptly assessed and reported to medical and emergency management authorities for 
situational awareness and for immediate determination of needed actions to restore or 
maintain their operational status.
On September 20, 2017, after causing devastation in other islands in the Caribbean region, 
Hurricane Maria made landfall on the island of Puerto Rico as a category 4 storm. Entering 
the southeastern corner of Puerto Rico, the hurricane created a path of destruction north and 
then westward across the island, affecting approximately three and a half million inhabitants 
(11). Wind gusts of up to 120mph battered the island for approximately 12 hours. From 
September 19–21, rainfall amounts totaled more than two feet for some parts of the island, 
resulting in massive flooding. Impacts from the hurricane were felt in health care facilities 
across the island and those located in the two adjacent island municipalities of Vieques and 
Culebra. After the storm, emergency management officials reported that the entire island of 
Puerto Rico was without power, over 66% of the population lacked access to potable water, 
and up to 95% of cell and other communication services (e.g., landlines) were not 
operational (12). Devastation to infrastructure resulted in cascading effects that severely 
limited both public and private HCFs’ essential functions and services (13). The list of 
affected HCFs included Centro Medico, the central medical center, and an adjacent 
conglomerate of hospitals, including the island’s and Caribbean Region’s only trauma 
center; several regional medical centers; local and municipal facilities; and primary and 
community health centers.
Recent responses have successfully demonstrated the utility of standardized public health 
assessments as part of disaster epidemiologic tools for rapidly collecting data in the 
aftermath of disasters (14–17). In the United States, well-established methods, guidelines, 
mandates, and tools on how to carry out HCF-specific post-disaster assessments have yet to 
be developed and standardized. In the past, damage assessments of HCFs have been limited 
to predominantly hospitals with reports based largely on anecdotal information, usually from 
non-structured interviews with sparse descriptions of impacts or from mailed surveys instead 
of in-person assessments (4). Structured assessments and checklists, similar to those used by 
the World Health Organization’s “Safe Hospitals programmes”, have been encouraged for 
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facilities at various levels of care. However, most assessments have been used for 
preparedness or to assess a limited number of facilities outside the United States (3, 5, 10, 
18–20).
Federal support following major disasters is part of the activities delineated under the 
National Response Framework, and assessment of public health and medical needs is one of 
the core functions of Emergency Support Function-#8 (ESF-8), Public Health and Medical 
Services responsibilities (21). The United States Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) serves as the lead agency for ESF-8, with additional federal agencies providing 
technical support and assistance. Per their procedures during large disasters, the Incident 
Response Coordination Team (IRCT) is deployed to assist with coordinating and providing 
support to the affected jurisdictions in assessing response and recovery needs and delivering 
medical care and public health preventive services (22). As a result of Hurricane Maria’s 
devastation, additional public health response personnel were deployed, and the existing 
team transitioned into a public health branch (PHB) operating in collaboration with PRDOH. 
A management structure was established to organize the branch into several specialized 
teams capable of performing specific public health assessments and support functions. 
Teams were formed around the following focus areas: environmental health (Surveillance 
and Assessment Team), restoration of services (Public Health Restoration Team), health 
communications (Health Communication Team), health surveillance (Surveillance and 
Assessment Team), and public health assessments (Public Health Field Team). Determining 
the damage and operational status of HCFs in Puerto Rico was deemed a priority by the 
Puerto Rico Department of Health (PRDOH) and DHHS. To address this need, the PHB 
developed and implemented infrastructure capacity assessment tools (ICAT) specifically for 
HCFs, including hospitals and health care centers. This manuscript describes the activities 
and processes to execute assessments of HCFs, provides the findings of those assessments 
and the impacts to the health care systems, and identifies potential areas of improvement for 
support and coordination of assessments of critical infrastructure, including HCFs, in post-
disaster settings.
Methods
All hospitals on the island were selected for evaluation from an updated list of HCF’s 
provided by the PRDOH. Preliminary discussions were held with commonwealth, federal, 
and Department of Defense (DoD) officials to define the scope of the assessments, discuss 
tools and methods for the assessments, coordinate the necessary logistical support and 
transportation, and prioritize a current list of facilities for evaluation based on PRDOH 
needs. Following these discussions, the PHB adapted an existing prototype hospital 
assessment into a set of paper-based infrastructure capacity assessment tools (ICAT). During 
the assessment period, the PHB leadership briefed local and federal officials on a daily basis 
regarding the status of the assessments and presented future planning activities for 
leadership approval and securing logistical support.
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Infrastructure Capacity Assessment Tools
The ICAT were developed by the PHB to evaluate hospitals and health care centers. 
Development took place in collaboration with PRDOH and included queries from their pre-
existing tools. For the ICAT, multiple domains were designed to obtain information on 
operational unit capacity, structural concerns (e.g., roof damage), and other issues of 
concern. For the hospital tool, information on current patient census, number of beds lost, 
number of morgue spaces available, and number of bodies held in the morgue was obtained; 
for health care centers assessments, the tool collected information regarding the number of 
patients treated and released and the number treated and transferred. To assess HCFs, the 
PHB piloted a hospital-specific ICAT that was developed as a prototype from knowledge 
gained during prior hurricane response activities, but the tool had not previously been used 
during an actual event. This tool was piloted at several hospitals in Puerto Rico in late 
September 2017, post-Hurricane Maria. After the pilot work, the tool was finalized for 
hospital assessments, and a modified version was developed for health care centers. 
Specifically, the modified version was developed in consultation with members of the health 
sector and the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) response personnel.
Data collection
Assessments of HCFs began on September 28, 2017 and October 7, 2017, respectively. 
Phase one of the assessments used a hierarchical tiered approach ranging from tiers 1 
through 3; the priority HCFs included in tiers 1–3 were determined based on population 
density, critical services offered, and access to other health care facilities. Tiers 1 and 2 were 
hospital facilities; Tier 3 included larger health care center facilities and regional medical 
centers. Phase 2 encompassed all other health care clinic facilities, including private and 
public facilities and those facilities with mental health in-patient services. Each assessment 
team consisted of 2 to 3 public health specialists, including environmental health scientists, 
engineers, and sanitarians, some of whom had experience working with HCFs. When 
required, translators provided by FEMA were used.
For consistency during the data collection efforts, all field teams received training in the 
administration of the assessment tools. During staff rotations, existing staff trained new field 
assignees; this allowed for appropriate survey techniques and methods to be grasped by team 
members before deploying to the field. Assessment data were gathered through face-to-face 
interviews with hospital and health care center administrators or their assigned personnel 
(e.g., facility safety officer). Hospital administrators self-reported structural damage using a 
qualitative scale, specifically categorized as none, minor, moderate, severe, and total. 
Information on flood/water damage was obtained and included damage due to water 
intrusion from a variety of issues (e.g., roof damage, broken windows). Other information 
collected by the field assessment teams included photographs of damage, lists of supply 
needs, and immediate issues and needs identified by the HCF administrator. Teams debriefed 
and compiled a synopsis of the most critical findings, which was provided to HHS, FEMA, 
and PRDOH on a daily basis. The paper forms, along with a brief summary of high-level 
findings, were also compiled and delivered to HHS, FEMA, and PRDOH daily. At the end 
of each day, assessment forms were entered into a secure database for analysis. Due to the 
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need for updated status, a limited number of HCFs were assessed a second time. Health care 
facility assessments were completed on November 17, 2017.
Survey123 App development
In collaboration with the Puerto Rico Planning Board, the ICAT paper assessment tools were 
translated into an app-based ICAT suite available in both Spanish and English, using the 
ESRI Survey123 (ICAT app) for ArcGIS software (ESRI, Redlands, CA). The ICAT app 
was downloaded on IPads (Apple, Inc., Cupertino, CA) and piloted October 31, 2017 to 
November 18, 2017. The HCF assessment data and photographs of damages to the facilities 
were directly entered and uploaded into the app by the field teams. Whenever a stable 
internet signal was available, the survey data were uploaded to the server. Due to the island-
wide power outages, this activity was often only possible upon return to the base of 
operations (the Joint Field Office). Once uploaded, the survey data were immediately 
available for viewing online and in several file formats (e.g., Excel, CSV, fileGDB).
Results
Hospital Facilities
The Tier 1 and 2 hospital assessments were completed on 64 (97%) hospitals in Puerto Rico 
(Figure 1). One of the 64 (2%) hospitals reported being closed as a result of damages from 
the hurricane. At the time of assessment, 51 (80%) hospitals reported they were on the 
power grid, and 57 (89%) reported they had an operable generator. Of the 64 hospitals 
assessed, four (6%) reported a shortage of safe drinking water, and one hospital reported 
having no safe drinking water. The average patient census at the time of assessment was 111 
(range 0–370). Hospitals reported losing an average of 6.9 beds (range 0–100). In addition to 
patient census and beds lost, the assessment contained queries regarding facility morgues. 
The average number of total morgue spaces was 6.4, and the average number of deceased 
being held was 1.4 (range 0–8). For facility needs and shortages, medication was the most 
commonly reported shortage followed by oxygen, 22% (n=14) and 20% (n=13), 
respectively. No hospitals reported shortages of blood, and few hospitals reported shortages 
of personal protective equipment (PPE) and vaccines, 5% (n=3) and 11% (n=7), respectively. 
Approximately 6% (n=4) of hospitals reported shortages of medical staff and 5% (n=3) 
reported shortages of administrative staff; no hospitals reported a complete absence of 
medical or administrative staff.
Operational Units
Operational units perform services, including emergency care, obstetrics, intensive care, and 
pediatrics. The majority of the hospitals reported being operational; however, specific 
operational unit capability varied (Table 1). Surgical units and X-ray were the units most 
frequently reported as being partially open or having limited capacity (n=7, 11%). Very few 
hospitals reported any of the operational units as being closed (maximum of three hospitals 
for a specific operational unit closure).
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Structural damage
The majority of hospitals reported no damage to foundation, road access, walls, or lighting; 
however, more than half (65%) reported damage to the roof. Specifically, 23%, 23%, and 
19% of facilities reported minor, moderate, and severe roof damage, respectively. The most 
common structural damage reported was minor damage to windows, n=24 (Table 2). 
Additionally, 35 hospitals (55%) reported flood/water damage and 42 (66%) reported wind 
damage.
Health Care Centers
A total of 193 assessments were performed on 186 health care centers (Figure 2). Tier 3 
facilities (n=16) were assessed initially, followed by assessment of the majority of health 
care centers on the island (Phase 2, n=170). Of the 186 health care centers, 14 (7%) reported 
being closed, 114 (61%) were operational but had sustainment needs, and 56 (29%) were 
fully operational. Seventeen health care centers reported having no communication 
capability. Only 63 health care centers (34%) reported they were fully on the electrical grid, 
and 58 (31%) reported intermittent service on the grid. Eighty-three health care centers 
(45%) reported a generator-only power source; of these, nine facilities (11%) reported 
inoperable generators. Sixty-three facilities (45%) reported a shortage of safe drinking water, 
and 11 (6%) reported having no safe drinking water. The number of patients treated in the 
last 24 hours ranged from 0 to 891, with an average of 98.5. The number of morgue spaces 
available ranged from 0 to 11, with an average of 0.5. For health care center needs and 
shortages, medications were the most commonly reported shortage (n=73, 40%), followed 
by vaccines (n=65, 35%). Additionally, 28 health care centers reported having no vaccines. 
Less than 10% of health care centers reported a shortage of medical staff.
Operational Units
While the majority of the health care centers reported being at least partially operational, the 
specific operational unit capability varied (Table 3). Outpatient was the unit most often 
reported being partially operational (29%), followed by X-ray (22%). However, not all 
operational units were present at all health care centers. For example, only 109 health care 
centers contained emergency departments. Of the 109 centers with EDs, 26 reported their 
center was partially operational. For all operational units being reported as partially 
operational, the ED was the unit least frequently reported.
Structural damage
The majority of facilities reported no damage to the foundation and walls. The most 
commonly reported structural damages of any severity were roof and window damage, 
n=124 and n=46, respectively (Table 4). For roof damage, 19%, 25%, 17%, and 3% of health 
care centers reported minor, moderate, severe and total damage, respectively. Over 50% of 
health care centers reported flood/water damage, n=100, and wind damage, n=101. Overall, 
32 health care centers reported collapsed structures, three of which were closed.
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App-based ICAT pilot testing
The ICAT app was piloted at 76 health care centers (41%) from October 31, 2017 through 
November 18, 2017. The teams examined the utility of the app by simultaneously 
administering paper and app-based ICAT assessment at each location. The pilot work 
indicated that use of the app resulted in an estimated time savings of 1 hour per survey. 
Specifically, the need for rewriting of paper-based surveys (due to legibility issues) at the 
end of the daily assessments was eliminated, resulting in an estimated 15 minutes of time 
saved per survey. The need for data entry from paper-based surveys into the electronic 
database was eliminated, along with quality assurance/quality control of data entry. The 
elimination of these data entry steps resulted in an estimated 45 minutes per survey saved. 
Additionally, the use of the ICAT app allowed for immediate database download and 
dissemination to federal partners. A dashboard was also created allowing for rapid viewing 
of high-priority field data, specifically communication status, power status, and other critical 
information needs (Figure 3).
Discussion
The current investigation reports on damage and operational assessments of a large number 
of hospitals and health care centers in Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria. The 
information collected as part of the HCF assessments was used to drive response-related 
activities for various federal and local agencies. For example, the information was used to 
initiate immediate action in specific cases for the designated Tier 1 and 2 hospitals and Tier 
3 clinics (e.g., delivery of a satellite phone for a clinic without any communication 
capabilities). The assessments were also used to prioritize temporary repairs (e.g., 
installation or repair of temporary “blue” roof structures) and the initiation and submission 
of Resource Request Forms. Information on HCF operational status and capabilities was 
used to aid the DoD strategic planning for establishing temporary medical treatment sites in 
Puerto Rico.
The impacts as indicated in the results from the HCF assessments are similar to those 
reported in previous events involving other types of natural disasters, including earthquakes 
and floods (2–5). For example, a majority of hospitals and health care centers reported 
damage to the roof. This is similar to a survey conducted by the Florida Hospital Association 
in 2004, which noted the most significant damage to hospitals post-hurricane was to the roof 
(5).
A decrease in medical care and treatment capacity and other issues, such as loss of 
communications and utilities, are known to occur as a result of the direct impacts from a 
natural disaster or the cascading effects from the lack of power, inability to procure adequate 
supplies of fuel, and failure of auxiliary power generation equipment. Flooding and water 
intrusion may result in loss of sterilization capabilities; heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning; and basic sanitary and hygienic systems all of which are necessary for hospital 
safety and infection prevention and control. Water damage could also contribute to the 
development of mold and other pathogen growth. Wind damage, as reported in some 
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facilities, may also cause significant loss of medical equipment and structural damage 
leading to water intrusion and other issues.
During the Hurricane Maria Response, the PHB conducted the environmental assessments of 
hospitals and health care centers and provided summaries of these assessments, including a 
list of critical needs, on a daily basis to HHS, FEMA, and PRDOH. Daily feedback is 
essential during the early phase of the response as facilities’ status may change unexpectedly 
and can fluctuate from fully operational to a non-operational status in a short time span. 
Specifically for the Tier 1 and 2 hospitals, the data collected as part of the assessments was 
used for documenting the need for various temporary field medical facilities, including DoD 
facilities, in Puerto Rico. The information was also used to initiate immediate action in 
specific cases for the high-priority hospitals and health care centers, especially those 
experiencing shortages of critical supplies such as fuel, water, and staffing. Furthermore, as 
the event shifted from response to recovery, the information compiled from the assessments, 
along with other sources of information including pictures and diagrams of damages and 
effects, was used to prioritize temporary repairs and for initiation and submission of 
applications for additional assistance with damage.
Several limitations and challenges were identified in the initiation, implementation, and 
continuation of HCF assessments. Immediate initiation of assessments was not possible due 
to safety concerns; once teams were allowed to initiate the assessments, all teams were 
required to be escorted by law enforcement due to safety concerns and mandatory curfew. 
The field teams often lacked Spanish-speaking assessors, which resulted in the need for 
translators and a smaller number of teams available for assessments. Another limitation that 
has been documented in previous disaster responses is the issue of redundancy and lack of 
coordination between assessment entities (23). Multiple agencies were conducting 
assessments using a variety of forms and interview methods, resulting in redundancy of 
efforts and confusion. Many facilities administrators reported feeling overwhelmed by the 
number of entities asking for similar information which resulted in time taken away from 
their other essential activities related to the disaster. Stronger agency collaboration and 
coordination and data sharing could reduce redundancy and improve situational awareness in 
future responses, and reduce burden on facility administrators. The real-time GIS 
capabilities of the ICAT app will allow for multi-agency collaboration and coordination 
which may improve situational awareness and diminish redundancy, duplication of efforts, 
and participant fatigue.
In contrast to other groups conducting assessments during this response, the use of 
standardized data collection tools and training allowed for more consistent data collection 
and resulted in improved data quality. Additionally, the ICAT app piloted during the 
response demonstrated the feasibility and utility of using app-based survey tools during 
response activities. Specifically the use of the ICAT app in lieu of paper-based surveys 
allowed for elimination of database entry needs, resulting in an increase in efficiency and 
data quality.
In conclusion, health care facility infrastructure was affected, including reduced capabilities 
and medication and medical supply shortages, post-Hurricane Maria as determined by 
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assessment of 97% of hospitals and 87% of health care centers in Puerto Rico. However, 
only a small percent of hospitals and health care centers reported being closed due to 
damages from the hurricane. As situational awareness and assessment data are of the essence 
in disaster response and recovery, the use of standardized assessment tools resulted in 
consistent, high-quality data collection, and the tools should be considered as a model for 
environmental assessments of health care facilities in future disaster response situations. The 
development and piloting of the ICAT app indicated that electronic-based surveys provide an 
opportunity for improved efficiency and speed of data collection and data management, 
specifically with the elimination of the data entry step and increased data quality with the 
reduction of data entry errors. Recently, a pilot scale project was completed for the 
development and implementation of the Comprehensive Disaster Assessment and Readiness 
Tools (CDART) for health care facilities in Puerto Rico. The pilot CDART project, 
conducted in collaboration with the PRDOH and Puerto Rico Planning Board, resulted in an 
increased capacity within the PRDOH for preparedness and response activities. Currently, 
efforts to develop a comprehensive question/variable databank and set of survey templates 
and to expand and standardize CDART are underway. The tools, including app-based 
surveys, can be requested, and modifications can be made specific for agency and response 
needs. Once finalized, the CDART tools and platform will enable state, local, territorial, 
tribal, and federal public health officials to collect geospatial and assessment data and 
disseminate key information in near real-time, while increasing efficiency and reducing 
redundancy during disaster responses.
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Figure 1: 
Map of hospitals assessed in Puerto Rico from September through November 2017
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Figure 2: 
Map of health care centers assessed in Puerto Rico from October through November 2017
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Figure 3: 
Dashboard of high-priority information collected during pilot testing of the ICAT app, 
November 2017
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Table 1:
Operational unit capability at hospitals reported during initial hospital assessment, September through 
November 2017
Operational Unit Fully operational Partially operational Closed Unknown/Not applicable*
ED** 53 (83%) 3 (5%) 1 (2%) 7 (11%)
Laboratory 55 (86%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 9 (14%)
X-ray 48 (75%) 7 (11%) 1 (2%) 8 (13%)
ICU*** 46 (72%) 5 (8%) 3 (5%) 10 (16%)
Med surgical 47 (73%) 4 (6%) 3 (5%) 10 (16%)
Neonatal 26 (41%) 1 (2%) 3 (5%) 34 (53%)
Pediatric 44 (69%) 0 (0%) 3 (5%) 17 (27%)
Dialysis 38 (60%) 2 (3%) 1 (2%) 23 (36%)
Mental 16 (25%) 1 (2%) 2 (3%) 45 (70%)
Maternity 34 (53%) 0 (0%) 3 (5%) 27 (42%)
Operating 44 (69%) 7 (11%) 3 (5%) 10 (16%)
Outpatient 46 (72%) 2 (3%) 2 (3%) 14 (22%)
Pharmacy 60 (94%) 2 (3%) 1 (3%) 1 (2%)
Disinfection 55 (86%) 0 (0%) 2 (3%) 7 (11%)
*
For the purpose of information presentation, both unknown and not applicable are combined; however, these were reported separately in the 
assessment. Some fields may total >100% due to rounding.
**
Emergency Department
***
Intensive Care Unit
Disaster Med Public Health Prep. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2020 August 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Irvin-Barnwell et al. Page 15
Table 2:
Hospitals reporting structural damage* at the time of initial assessment, September through November 2017 
(n=64)**
Structure No damage Minor Moderate Severe
Windows 32 (50%) 24 (38%) 4 (6%) 4 (6%)
Foundation 62 (97%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 0 (0%)
Road access 58 (91%) 4 (6%) 2 (3%) 0 (0%)
Roof 22 (34%) 15 (23%) 15 (23%) 12 (19%)
Walls 41 (64%) 14 (22%) 6 (9%) 3 (5%)
Lighting 53 (83%) 7 (11%) 3 (5%) 1 (2%)
HVAC*** 37 (58%) 11 (17%) 10 (16%) 5 (8%)
Damage No Yes
Flood/Water**** 29 (45%) 35 (55%)
Wind 22 (34%) 42 (66%)
*
Damage to the structure could be the result of wind damage, flood/water damage, or both.
**Not all rows will total 100% due to rounding
***
Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
****
Damage could be the result of flood or water intrusion from a variety of issues (e.g., roof damage, window damage).
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Table 3:
Health care center reported operational unit capability at the time of assessment, October through November 
2017*
Operational unit Fully operational Partially operational Closed Not applicable/Unknown**
ED*** 83 (43%) 26 (13%) 0 (0%) 69 (36%)
Outpatient 95 (49%) 56 (29%) 0 (0%) 24 (12%)
Pediatrics 88 (46%) 40 (21%) 0 (0%) 50 (26%)
Maternity 45 (23%) 22 (11%) 0 (0%) 109 (56%)
Metal health 62 (32%) 28 (15%) 0 (0%) 89 (46%)
Pharmacy 66 (34%) 30 (16%) 1 (0.5%) 79 (41%)
Laboratory 76 (39%) 32 (17%) 0 (0%) 65 (34%)
X-ray 65 (34%) 42 (22%) 2 (1%) 60 (31%)
The number of assessments was 193 as a small number of facilities were assessed twice. Not all fields will equal 193 as some facilities did not 
report specific items
*
Due to missing data not all fields will total 193
**
For the purpose of information presentation, both unknown and not applicable are combined; however, these were reported separately in the 
assessment.
***
Emergency Department
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Table 4:
Number of health care centers reporting structural damage* October through November 2017 (total number of 
health care centers assessed, n=186)**
Structure Minor Moderate Severe Total
Windows 32 (17%) 8 (4%) 5 (3%) 1 (0.5%)
Foundation 4 (2%) 3 (2%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0%)
Road access 17 (9%) 6 (3%) 7 (4%) 0 (0%)
Roof 37 (19%) 48 (25%) 33 (17%) 6 (3%)
Walls 13 (7%) 12 (6%) 5 (3%) 4 (2%)
Lighting 25 (13%) 13 (7%) 4 (2%) 4 (2%)
HVAC*** 21 (11%) 23 (12%) 18 (9%) 12 (6%)
Damage No Yes
Flood/Water**** 77 (40%) 100 (52%)
Wind 75 (39%) 101 (52%)
*
Damage to the structure could be the result of wind damage, flood/water damage, or both.
**Not all rows will total 100% due to rounding
***
Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
****
Damage could be the result of flood or water intrusion from a variety of issues (e.g., roof damage, window damage).
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